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## **Importance of Effective Resource Mobilization by the Indian Ocean Region Navies to Conduct HADR in the Affected Country**

Good afternoon distinguished guests, ladies and gentlemen. I am Capt Paul Mandziy, Director of Maritime Operations from Navy Strategic Command. I, and my team, are situated as a lodger unit at Headquarters Joint Command, Canberra, which allows the Maritime Operations team to be available to HQJOC staff for subject matter expert advice, while also ensuring that Navy is involved in all operations planning.

During the next 30 mins I will cover '*The Importance of Effective Resource Mobilisation by Indian Ocean Region Navies to conduct Humanitarian and Disaster Relief in the Affected Areas*'.

I cannot speak with authority for other Indian Ocean Region Navies, so I will cover the topic from the Australian point of view and hopefully there is some aspects of this presentation that may be useful for other participants at this Workshop.

I note that the focus on the previous presentations was to describe and outline the HADR problem as a consequence of climatic challenges. There has also been a focus on how Navies contribute to regional HADR efforts. I would like a different perspective that looks at a joint approach that is in line with Government efforts from Australia, a nation that has regularly provided HADR support. Notwithstanding, Australia too also suffers HADR situations that are linked to Climate Change such as the SE Australian Bushfires and the increased frequency of Cyclones (with the most destructive destroying the entire NE Australian banana crop. But as a developed nation Australia is in the fortunate position to have the resources to deal with these HADR shocks.

### **Scope**

This presentation will cover the topics as shown.

- The Tyranny of Distance

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Presently he is appointed as the Director Maritime Operations in the Joint Operations Command Headquarters. Captain Mandziy is also a navy pilot and flown both fixed and rotary wing aircraft as Lieutenant.

- Whole of Government Response to HADR
- The Required HADR Effect
- HADR Capabilities
- A Regional HADR Op Review
- Principles for Success
- Challenges for Mobilisation
- Current Contributions

I will first touch on the tyranny of distance involved with HADR operations within the Indian Ocean region and discuss the Naval and Military involvement in HADR as part of a broader Whole of Government response, with a focus on an ADF experience.

Following on from this, I will highlight the effect countries are seeking when mobilising for HADR, and specifically the capabilities that are at our disposal and some of the planning considerations for these types of operations.


Then I will briefly review key elements of ADF involvement in Operation Sumatra Assist, which was Australia's response to the tsunami that struck the region in December 2004.

I will then complete this brief by covering some guiding principles for HADR success and the challenges that are faced to effectively mobilise resources for HADR.


### **The Effect of Distance**

This slide shows the concentration points in Australia where military HADR capability is located. As you can see, it covers the eastern seaboard and our northern most city, Darwin.

I have arced a circle, with a radius of 3000nm, from Darwin. Australia's response to a HADR event within this immediate area simplifies the initial response, movement of assets and/or equipment and logistics and is very much related to distance. As you can see Australia straddles the Indian and Pacific as such our focus is equally divided between the two oceans with both regions having their respective HADR issues.



This slide highlights the distance involved in the Indian Ocean region. As you can see, the distance for a flight from Darwin to Bangladesh is approximately 6000 km. This only covers the eastern portion of the Indian Ocean.



As the distance increases, so does the difficulty in providing assets for initial response, and therefore the initial response time. This problem is not limited to Australia but is factor in varying degrees for all other IO nations when planning to deal with a HADR situation.

### **Whole of Government Response**

As a global citizens, IO nations including Australia recognise the humanitarian responsibilities in providing aid to countries in need and this certainly extends to the provision of assistance to countries affected by disasters.

That said, this does not mean that nations can unilaterally provide support. The affected nation should assess the situation and if deemed necessary invite other nations to assist in the HADR situation or at the very least provide some indication that an intention to offer an invite may be provided, to ensure the planning process for assistance can commence in the contributing nation.

In Australia's case if a regional disaster occurs then an *Interdepartmental Emergency Task Force* is established. This brings together all the key government departments in a collaborative planning sense to ensure that a coordinated whole of government response is achieved.

The lead organisation with respect to regional HADR in Australia is the Australian Agency for International Development (AusAID). They are responsible to the Minister for Foreign Affairs and Trade for managing Australia's overseas aid programs, including Australia's assistance to developing nations during, and in the aftermath, of disasters.

The role of the military is generally in support, not to lead, Disaster Relief efforts. Notwithstanding, as with other regional militaries the ADF is in a unique position to play a critical role in the early stages of a disaster; as it has the capacity to deploy people, technical expertise and deliver supplies at a rate beyond the capacity of most other government and civilian agencies.

In Australia's case – during the planning phase, the ADF liaison officers work with AusAID staff to develop and assess the requests for ADF assistance. ADF assistance is managed through Defence Liaison staff in the DFAT crisis management centre. Throughout this process there is constant interaction with the affected nation's government and lead disaster agencies.

## **Planning & Assumptions**

When Australian Government agencies plan to deploy into disaster areas, several key issues are factored in and assumptions are made including:

1. AusAID will deploy a LO, embedded with the ADF contingent, in order to allow them to make a first hand assessment of the situation on the ground talking directly to local national authorities.
2. The Host Nation Head of Mission will act as the Principle Australian Government representative and will deal with the Foreign Affairs department of the affected nation.
3. Host nation supports the presence of the ADF and the population also agrees to ADF personnel on the ground, in a support role.
4. The initial assessment, by AusAID and ADF Contingent, is critical in identifying the right amount of logistical support needed. This first assessment looks at the local logistic support and infrastructure available and what is able to be provided by the Host Nation, as well as what other contributing nations can provide.

The Australian Government's intention regarding HADR assistance, will generally be to provide immediate relief with the smallest footprint that is practicable. Personnel will then be extracted as soon as possible, allowing the host nation to continue their rebuilding program. It is at this stage that Australia will continue to contribute by other means, including assisting with the rebuilding program.

When ADF personnel are inserted in the initial phase they will be self sufficient for at least 7 days on the assumption that little host nation capacity and infrastructure will be available.

Australian government HADR contingency stocks are available from within the ADF national stockholding reserves and can be moved into the AO as required.

## **HADR Effect**

The ADF experience in HADR operations to date has highlighted that the three main areas that require initial action and resource allocation are:

1. Health support
2. Strategic lift. This will be most likely be air transport to get in the HADR immediate relief stores, with planning for sealift for follow-on support (dependent on distance) and
3. Engineering support.

It is these effects in response to a HADR situation that will determine:

1. The required force structure,

2. The size of the footprint required to achieve the mission, and
3. The logistical requirement to enable the initial phase to proceed effectively and the follow on logistics required.

It is worth highlighting that if these areas are planned and executed effectively, the transition from Disaster Relief to Humanitarian Assistance can be conducted relatively quickly and smoothly thereby minimising wasted resources and time.

### **HADR Capabilities**

To ensure effective mobilisation and lodgement of the HADR Effect in theatre, the HADR capabilities must be quick responding and carry sufficient capability and sustainment for the initial response phase to allow time for planners to generate a more robust medium and longer term HADR response plan.

Dependent on the size and severity of the HADR situation and what local facilities are available; an initial response will generally be by air. In the ADF's capacity this will be with C-17 and/or C130. Dependent on the length of the operation, and the required stores to be moved, Naval amphibious and strategic lift assets can also be used.

Once 'on the ground', movement within Theatre is essential. While rotary wing assets are the preferred, noting flexibility, it is this capacity where cooperation between contributing nations is essential. A movement coordination cell, to liaise with the affected nation and other contributing nations, will assist in ensuring an overall coordinated effort is achieved.

Protection and security – While HADR operations are generally conducted in a permissive environment, increased civil unrest and criminality may result from the breakdown in order following a HADR event. Host nations may request assistance to augment local and national security arrangements for the protection of contributing nation's personnel. This should always be co-ordinated through local police and clear ROE agreed to.

### **HADR Capabilities**

As already stated, the ADF experience is that medical assistance and engineering support are the first HADR capabilities required in theatre. Once both capabilities are 'in country', follow-on in-country assessments identify longer term support options are made in consultation with the affected nation's authorities and other contributing nations HADR response teams. These early planning assessments and engagement with stakeholders provides the foundation for the development of longer term HADR support options.

Other areas of support that can be offered after the initial response include port operations and clearance, and hydrographic support, noting that shipping lane and port clearance will be essential for sustainment of the immediate response and the longer term recovery of the affected country.

- **Navies are key deliverers of HADR capability**

- Amphibious ships, Strategic Sealift
- Sea-based support does not impact shore infrastructure
  - ✓ Helicopters
  - ✓ Medical Teams
  - ✓ HA logistic delivery
  - ✓ Presence
- **LHD**
  - Replacing LPA (1/3 LHD capacity)
  - Capacity – 28,000t, 12 helo, two operating theatres, 60 bed hospital, 1,000 troop, 4 x LC, command platform, communication hub
  - Intro into service 2014

### **Typical HADR Phases**

Generally there are 4 phases in dealing with a HADR situation; namely immediate response, preparation & deployment, sustained operations and re-deployment. In Australia's case when a regional HADR situation develops, AusAID will discuss response options (including likely tasks) with the ADF before formally requesting military assistance. The phases are more broadly explained as follows:

#### **Immediate response (D to D+2)**

The following may occur:

1. Deployment of a Defence support team to assist Embassy/AusAID/DFAT staff in the affected Host Nation
2. Evacuation of Australian and approved foreign nationals from disaster area, to relieve pressure on local rescue and support agencies, and
3. Provision of immediate HA to personnel in the disaster area.

#### **Preparation/deployment (D+1 to D+7)**

1. Deployment of AusAID, ADF and other GOAS assessment teams
2. Establishment of JTF/CTF structure (coordinate NGOs)
3. Preparation of follow on forces in Australia, and
4. Deployment of the main force element.

#### **Sustained ADF DR/HA operation. (D+5 to D+??)**

1. Dispersal of humanitarian aid to outlying regions.
2. Reconstruction tasks.
3. Medical support to affected populations, and
4. Other activities as directed or requested.

### **Redeployment**

The extraction of forces and equipment from the host nation.

### **A Review of an ADF HADR Ops**

I would now like to give you a very brief overview of the ADF's participation in Operation Sumatra Assist. I highlight this HADR operation for review because:

(a) It is a well known event, and

(b) Australia was able to effectively mobilise resources and provide effective assistance to Indonesia.

After the tsunami struck in the early hours of 27th December 2004, our Chief of Defence Force advised senior Military staff there had been a significant Natural Disaster in our Region and that an Inter-Departmental Task Force (IDTF) had been created.

He directed Chief of Joint Logistics (CJLOG), amongst other key military planners, to start looking at what military assets were available for immediate deployment that would be appropriate for disaster relief.

A review of the lessons learnt from previous HADR operations (i.e. Bali Assist) revealed some of the issues we should consider and some of the capabilities that we had deployed previously, which could prove to be useful again in this instance.

As a result of the IDTF, details started to come to hand about the magnitude of the destruction that had been caused in the Aceh Region in Indonesia:

- 9.3 earthquake followed 15 minutes later by a 34m wave
- Between 173,000 - 220,000 dead
- 500,000 people displaced
- Towns of Banda Aceh and Muelaboh significantly affected
- Food and water shortages
- Paralysis of Indonesian provincial government due to infrastructure losses

- Limited access to Aceh
- Roads swept away & Ports destroyed
- Limited capacity of airfields
- Significant environmental threats from:
  - ✓ unburied dead
  - ✓ lack of sanitation & lack of clean water
- Security constraints posed a dilemma for an unarmed force:
  - ✓ previous insurgency activity
- Large numbers of volunteers, aid organisations and military forces were involved

### **What Was The Aim?**

Following a request for assistance from the Indonesian Government, AusAID identified the level of support required from the ADF. The three main aims for the ADF were identified as,

- Transportation of HA stores to the disaster area
- Medical aid, and
- Engineering support

There were varying approaches between nations, with some nations preferring to deploy reconnaissance parties, conduct deliberate planning and then deploy personnel and equipment. In Australia's case immediate HADR response action was assessed as appropriate in parallel with medium term planning.

### **Immediate Response – D+7**

The sequence of events is shown on this slide in a good indication of the rapid response time by the ADF, which was facilitated by some immediate planning during the Christmas Leave period; a reduced activity period for the ADF.

As well as delivery of immediate response, concurrent planning identified future stages of the operation and the military capabilities required.

The close working relationship of Defence with DFAT and AusAID, and the Indonesian Government, was the key to getting things moving so quickly and effectively.

### **Evolving Response – D+14**

If you remember back to one of the first slide, I highlighted what I considered Australia's immediate region. While Aceh is only just outside that 3000km arc, the proximity to Darwin



allowed the initial strategic transport response from both the Air Force and Navy to be achieved in relatively quick-time.

### **Force Disposition**

This slide illustrates the main ADF force element disposition during Operation Sumatra Assist in the Sustainment Phase

It is worth highlighting, the role of the third nation – Malaysia – in providing a key logistics node or 'agreed point' into the area of operation.

In proving effective resource mobilisation, an effective logistic chain is essential. For this HADR operation, it was achieved through collaboration of 3 countries working together. The key supply chain aspects of this operation involved:

1. All Australian stores and equipment were sent via commercial means to the established cargo consolidation point in Australia.
2. From there the stores were dispatched to RAAF RICHMOND (Sydney) for the sustainment flight or to Sydney International airport for a civilian flight into Malaysia.
3. The sustainment flight aircraft flew to RMAF Base Butterworth, via Darwin, where stores were unloaded for intra theatre distribution.
4. The movement of store from RMAF Base Butterworth into 'theatre' then became the responsibility of the Commander Joint Task Force of the operation.

### **HADR Delivered to Aceh**

This slide highlights how the ADF HADR team 'hit the ground running' and what was achieved for the duration of the operation.

It is worth focussing on the "24 Hr Period" column, and what was achieved in this initial short period. This provided a sound platform for further assistance.

### **Principles for Success**

Lessons learned from support to OP SUMATRA ASSIST and other HADR operations have provided the following guiding principles for success when conducting planning for HADR. They include:

#### **Relationships**

Communications is perhaps the most important aspect for successful interagency and multi-national operations. Understanding the true situation on the ground and what kind of support

is required by the affected population is paramount to putting together the right mix of logistics enablers. This includes:

- The Operations and log planning staffs liaising,
- The ADF and Government Agencies planning staff liaising,
- The Liaison Officers 'on the ground' providing sound advice, and
- Remaining ready to alter the planning as the situation dictates

### **Anticipation**

Anticipation is critical to an operations planning. Experience within the planning team will allow:

- Capability shortfalls to be identified, and
- Critical items to be identified and moved as required.

This anticipation allows the logistician to stay ahead, or at least 'in step', with operational decisions, therefore maximising the logistic planning cycle.

### **Information**

Details on the status of infrastructure, sanitation, airfields, ports, water, fuel, etc is essential. This information will be supplied by:

- Liaison Officers / Non Government Organisations
- Intelligence Organisations
- Embassy Staff
- Host Nation Support
- Other Nations
- Contractors
- On the Ground Reconnaissance (if conducted).

### **Principles for Success**

#### **Inventory**

To enable a rapid response, Humanitarian Assistance stores need to be maintained as configured packs and limited to stores not requiring intensive management. While the broader humanitarian response may be an integral part of the Government's decision to provide emergency assistance, the maintenance of a Humanitarian Assistance stores capability that can be deployed at short notice, will allow Government time to coordinate a tailored humanitarian response in a more deliberate manner.

Contingency packs are designed to satisfy the basic human needs of food, water, shelter and safety. The ADF maintains 48 pallets of stores (capacity of C130), which are packaged to enable choice in matching capability effect to the required situation. They are designed to be a 'one shot' capability that is not planned to be a sustained effect.

### **Logistic Support Requirements**

Logistics plays a large part in a successful HADR operation. The more details received at the early stages, allows more flexibility later.

The more accurate the information that can be provided will ensure the contributing nation is not just focused on sustaining the operation but in actually completing the Humanitarian Assistance mission.

### **Responsiveness**

A key benefit the military brings to HADR environment is responsiveness – the ability to respond rapidly with focussed effect. If the military is not going to be responsive – why bother using them?

### **Challenges**

In order to effectively mobilise your resources to the area of HADR need, there is a requirement to create a synergistic effect.

To achieve this, the information received and contribution by:

- The regional governments and militaries
- United Nations and Non Government Organisations, and
- The local population needs to be coordinated, accurate and timely.

This will allow the desired effect to be focussed, proportionate and efficient, rather than different areas/organisations working towards different goals, and therefore possible unknowingly working against each other. Coordination is the key!

In effect, this will allow the best delivery of what is needed to the affected nation, as opposed to delivering what is perceived to be needed. Good intentions, if not directed properly, can be more damaging and wasteful than conducting nothing.

Basically, each country needs to use their strengths effectively. Military organisations will always be the preferred option for the immediate response, as they have the man power, assets and flexibility to achieve this.

Both Government and Non Government organisations are the experts in the longer term Humanitarian Assistance.

If these two areas are well coordinated, the HADR operation will be successful.

### **Current Involvement**

Prior to finishing, I quickly want to touch on Australia's contribution to the HADR operation that currently has global interest, which are the floods in Pakistan.

Australia, along with most other countries, is providing assistance in varying forms. This consists of:

- A health centre, which is staffed by Australian civilian and defence doctors, nurses and paramedics, is now seeing more than 200 patients a day, some of whom are in critical need of medical attention,
- Over 180 personnel and over 100 tonnes of supplies and equipment from Defence and other government agencies. Australia's Pakistan flood relief totals \$75 million.

The distance from Australia has resulted in a combination of military and civilian air lift was used.

### **Way Forward**

- Agreed Regional HADR Response Doctrine and Procedures
  - Working Level Group activity required
  - Need cross Defence/Government agreement on approach
  - Interoperability Exercises
  - Multi-lateral and Bi-lateral Activities
  - Coordinated through Working Level Group reporting to Navy Chiefs forum
  - Providing Nations matching with Vulnerable Nations
-