NEED FOR A COMPREHENSIVE MARITIME SECURITY POLICY FOR IONS

The famous Italian philosopher Niccolo Machiavelli once said “The one who adapts his policy to the times prospers, and likewise that the one whose policy clashes with the demands of the times does not”. Contrastingly, the great American President Abraham Lincoln maintained “I never had a policy; I have just tried to do my very best each and every day”.

So, is policy a necessity for an entity to be successful; or is it superfluous and unnecessary? To further examine this issue, an understanding of the word 'policy' is in order. The venerable Oxford English Dictionary describes ‘policy’ as ‘A course of action adopted or proposed by an organization or person’ , while the Merriam-Webster Dictionary explains it as ‘a definite course or method of action selected from among alternatives and in light of given conditions to guide and determine present and future decisions’ . Thus, it may be inferred that 'policy' is not essential for an organisation but would definitely make it more efficient and effective, by enabling easier decision making, especially in specific situations. But does IONS classify as a conventional organisation; and does it need a Comprehensive Policy to help it function?

Aim

This paper aims to establish the need for a Comprehensive Maritime Security Policy for IONS, as IONS seeks to expand its scope of activities to the operational domain in the near future. The analysis will be undertaken by the following methodology: -

1. Examine the present guiding principles for the functioning of IONS;
2. Comprehend the unique maritime environment of the Indian Ocean Region (IOR) and its implications;
3. Establish the inadequacy of the present system for undertaking sustained maritime security operations, and therefore, the need for a Comprehensive Maritime Security Policy;
4. Determine some of the important factors to be considered before formulating the policy;
5. Understand the likely challenges in policy formulation and implementation; and in conclusion,
6. Briefly propose a prescriptive way ahead for the policy formulation process in IONS.

IONS — A Naval Grouping

IONS broadly put, is a regional forum of navies of littoral nations of the Indian Ocean, voluntarily coming together to discuss issues of regional maritime security and cooperation. Currently, IONS boasts 23 nations as Members and nine nations as Observers . Thus, IONS may not be considered as a conventional organisation, but rather, a grouping of like-minded organisations, interacting on an equal footing. The emphasis is on consensus building for decision making rather than individual influences, notions or beliefs. Hence, at the first instance, it would appear that 'policy' would not be relevant for a forum such as IONS. After all, the organisation has been in existence for eight years now and has been functioning fairly well without a policy. Then why does the question of policy for IONS arise now? To understand this we need to look into the functioning of IONS thus far, in the absence of a stipulated policy.

Charter of Business — Alternative to Policy?

Till recently, IONS Seminars were being organised and governed based on the procedure followed for the first IONS Seminar in 2007, and the initiative of the incumbent Chair Navy at each time. Apparently, the need for a set of formal rules governing the forum was felt, leading to the first version of the Charter of Business (CoB) being postulated in 2014. After a series of iterations, the latest version was proposed as recently as in Jan 2016.

The CoB is quite detailed and clearly brings out the aim, objectives, fundamental principles, etc, of the forum. The type of activities to be conducted under the IONS umbrella specified in the CoB, describes the conduct of symposiums, meetings and workshops in fairly great detail, but mentions exercises and other forms of maritime cooperation very briefly (which one would consider the aspiring rationale for forming IONS) . Consequently, it is no surprise that in the eight years since inception, IONS has accomplished only meetings and discussions, but no operations or exercises involving deployment of assets on ground. While we may surmise that IONS is still in the nascent stage and the organisation needs to mature further, it must be understood that regional dynamics are in a constant state of flux, thereby constantly altering the geo-political and strategic scenario. The nature of threats to maritime security are also continuously evolving, spreading to new domains and acquiring trans-national character. Therefore, IONS needs to look at ways to expeditiously put in place procedures and guidelines for meeting the implied operational objectives laid down in the CoB. But to do that, as a start point, we would need to have a common philosophy and understanding towards the various aspects of maritime security in the IOR, and most importantly, a singularity of purpose...............or in other words 'a policy'!

One could argue that the CoB provides this common understanding and singularity of purpose. In fact, initial steps have been taken towards expanding the scope of IONS’ activities, by the formation of IONS Working Groups (IWG) for HADR, MARSEC (Maritime Security) and Information Sharing& Interoperability. These IWGs have been mandated to formulate SOPs for undertaking joint exercises and operations . So, if the CoB is able to function as the guiding document or set of principles, then why the need for a separate policy? To find an answer, we need to delve into various issues of the maritime security environment in the IOR and their associated aspects.

Maritime Environment of the IOR

The Indian Ocean covers about 20% of the earth’s surface and is the third largest ocean in the world. Unlike the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans which span the North-South extent of the globe, the Indian Ocean is ‘roofed’ in the North by the Indian sub-continent. Hemmed in by the African continent on the west and the stretch of Australian landmass and Indonesian archipelago on the East, the Indian Ocean may even be considered akin to a large land-locked sea . The Indian Ocean also contains numerous large water bodies and maritime choke points, which have proven vital to global trade and commerce over the ages, and thereby, evinced persistent military interest. Economic interests have always attracted extra-regional powers who have wielded dominant influences in the IOR, from the trading Chinese between the 5th and 15th centuries and the colonising Europeans between the 15th to 20th centuries, to the current ‘great game’ players USA, European Union (EU), Russia and China.

The littorals of the Indian Ocean comprise 38 nation states, many of them islands with huge EEZs. The tropical waters of the Ocean and its moderate weather nurtured the growth of ancient civilisations along its shores, which interacted with each other extensively over the ages, acquiring a common ‘regional identity’. Today, the IOR littorals have some of the highest population densities in the world, accounting for about one-third of the world's total population . The varied character of nations along its shores and their vastly differing development indices, bring along a host of issues impinging on overall maritime security in the region.

Shipping, Trade and Commerce

The Indian Ocean is a vital commercial artery for the world economy. Today, 66% of the world’s seaborne oil, 50% of the container traffic and 33% of seaborne bulk cargo passes through the IOR annually . Middle East oil and the burgeoning Asian manufacturing and market-driven economies, especially China and India, drive trade in the IOR. Asia accounts for 40% of the global economy and in the next four years is likely to account for two-thirds of the world’s growth. The disruption of commercial links in the Indian Ocean would, therefore, have far reaching consequences, making them attractive targets for state (in times of conventional conflict), as well as, non-state actors. Political turmoil, along with the rise of terrorism and piracy in the IOR, has resulted in tremendous regional, as well as, extra-regional militarisation for protection of economic interests. Among all the oceans, currently IOR witnesses the highest military and commercial tonnage plying its waters.

Natural Resources

The Indian Ocean and its littorals have historically been a source of abundant resources of all types – living, energy, mineral, renewable, non-renewable, etc. While the IOR littorals exploit their land-based resources, trading them predominantly over the ocean, the resources concealed below the waters of the Indian Ocean, remain some of the least exploited in the world. Deep sea fish stocks, poly-metallic nodules, offshore oil deposits and various minerals have the potential to spark off intense competition amongst the littoral states as well as the extra-regional ‘great game’ powers. Inclusive and cooperative security policies to protect exploitation of resources may therefore require to be adopted by the IOR littorals.

Regional Conflicts

The IOR continues to be one of the most volatile regions in the world. From hostility between nuclear states (India-Pakistan) to civil war in Somalia and armed rebellion in Yemen, the IOR is witness to several conflicts and consequently high levels of militarisation. The Fragile States Index 2016 lists 12 IOR littorals in the ‘alert’ to ‘very high alert’ categories . Unresolved territorial disputes such as Kashmir and Sir Creek (IndiaPakistan); Arunachal and Aksai Chin (China-India); Persian Gulf islands of Abu Musa and Tunbs (Iran-UAE); etc, continue to fester and could spark regional conflict. Ethnic and religious diversities such as the Shia-Sunni divide in the Middle-East, Hindu-Muslim tensions in South Asia, Christian-Muslim differences in Africa, the Tamils in Sri Lanka, Kurds in Iraq, etc, also have the potential to destabilise the region. While many of these are internal issues and require to be dealt with by respective nation states, the embroilment of the politicomilitary forces in onshore conflict resolution restricts governance or regulation in offshore areas, thus affecting the security of maritime activities in the region. Consequently, extraregional powers like USA, Russia, EU, China, Japan and South Korea maintain military presence in the IOR in the form of permanent basing or frequent deployments, to secure their economic and strategic interests. The large and varied military footprint in the region has the potential to result in misunderstanding and friction due to overlapping (and sometimes conflicting) interests and areas of operation.

Non-Traditional Threats

De-colonisation of many IOR littorals in the 20th century left the economies of these countries in tatters, with weak political structures in place. The high poverty, political factionalism, widening economic divide and lack of law enforcement, created suitable conditions for the growth of non-traditional threats in many parts of the IOR. Though piracy has reduced in the past few years, armed robbery, illicit trafficking of narcotics, humans and Small Arms & Light Weapons (SALW), continues unabated. Illegal shipments traverse between source and destination, through the jurisdictional waters of several countries, by various modes ranging from containers to dhows, exploiting loopholes in the policing of the coastal areas by the IOR littorals. Maritime terrorism is another potential powder keg in the IOR. Though there have been no incidents of late, terror organisations such as the Al-Qaeda Arabian Peninsula (AQ-AP) and their links with Al-Shabaab in Somalia, Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT) in Pakistan and Jemaah Islamiyah in South East Asia remain active. The Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) has also forayed into the IOR carrying out attacks in Indonesia. The easy availability of trafficked weapons, narcotics fuelled finances and growing radicalisation among unemployed youth in the IOR littorals has created terror networks spanning several nations which can best be addressed through joint mechanisms to limit their spread through the maritime domain.

Environmental Pressures

With a large portion situated in the tropics, the IOR witnesses several unique weather phenomena such as the monsoons, cyclones etc. The rapid and dynamic shifts in meteorological conditions along with the presence of several seismic zones leads to several natural disasters such as drought, floods, earthquakes, tsunamis and super-cyclones. With the high density of populations along its shores, human suffering and economic loss in these disasters is tremendous. Most disasters simultaneously affect several states in a region requiring coordinated measures for HADR. In addition, population pressures on the shores of the IOR has led to destruction of habitats and environmental degradation, which along with climate change is seemingly affecting the IOR more than other regions. IOR littorals count among the most vulnerable environmental risk areas in the world. Low lying island nations such as Maldives, Mauritius and Seychelles are at high risk of being inundated by rising sea levels in the not too distant future. Degradation of environmental ecosystems and loss of the ocean’s living resources through marine pollution and over-exploitation by Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated (IUU) fishing could lead to large scale illegal human flows between littoral nations and encroachment into each other’s EEZs, sparking off conflict.

Maritime Capability of IOR Littorals

A major limitation many of the IOR littorals face is the lack of adequate maritime capability for basic maritime tasks such as surveillance and policing of their coasts and EEZs. This is attributable to lack of finances and in a few cases political will. Some island littorals such as Maldives and Seychelles have EEZs thousands of times the size of their land territory. While the bigger naval powers in the region such as India and Australia support some nations by transfer of assets such as patrol craft and maritime surveillance aircraft, some extra-regional powers such as China provide assets through soft loans or as part of a larger deal for developing local onsite facilities. India also assists in EEZ patrol of some nations such as Maldives, Mauritius and Seychelles by deploying ships and aircraft. Basic naval training assistance is provided by a number of countries within the IOR. However, all these measures are inadequate to meet the magnitude of requirements for ensuring robust and seamless maritime security in the IOR. There are no easy or short term solutions for enhancing the capability of the weaker IOR littorals. The only practicable approach would seemingly lie in pooling resources for common objectives, while developing low cost platforms for maritime surveillance and patrol to counter non-traditional threats.

Strategic Games by Extra-Regional Powers

The economic significance of the IOR and the growing economic might of China and India have made the IOR the new chessboard for the ‘Great Powers Game’. With the ongoing conflicts in the region, the IOR presents a profitable market for the arms industries of many extra-regional powers such as USA, EU, Russia, China, Israel and Turkey. With China increasing its military presence in the region in the hunt for resources, especially in the relatively untapped Africa, and aiming to secure its energy lines, the Western powers also jostle to remain relevant in the region and counter the growing Chinese clout. The recently proclaimed re-balance or shift of the US pivot to Asia is an indication of the growing importance of Asian affairs (and the IOR) to the strategic calculations of the great powers. There is an increasing thrust by extra-regional powers vying to enter into new strategic partnerships or strengthen existing links with IOR littorals, as can be seen in the Sino-Pak or Indo-US relationships.

Implications of the Maritime Environment of IOR on Need for Policy

As is evident from the major maritime issues in the IOR today, most threats in the region are long-term concerns without any simple solutions. Their transnational character and pervasive effects demand enduring constabulary action across large swathes of the ocean, which would be beyond the scope of small-scale, ad-hoc or single state measures. Currently, large scale multilateral constructs engaged in maritime security enforcement in the IOR are primarily steered by the extra-regional powers. But, as the world heads towards a multi-polar order, the geo-political and strategic interests of the major extra-regional powers may not always be congruent with each other. Thus, it is imperative that the IOR littorals evolve joint frameworks to resolve common issues in the IOR. The Indian Ocean Rim Association (IORA), earlier called IOR Association for Regional Cooperation (IOR-ARC), is one such pan-IOR framework created in 1997. However, IORA functions at the politico-diplomatic level and predominantly delves into the realm of economic and social (non-military) maritime endeavour in the IOR, though maritime safety and security has of late, been flagged as a priority area due to its direct socio-economic impact. In contrast, IONS being a naval construct is ideally positioned to not only deliberate, but also implement, holistic maritime security measures in the IOR.

But obviously, transitioning from the realm of discussion to implementation on ground is easier said than done. As the Indian Nobel laureate Rabindranath Tagore remarked “You can’t cross the sea merely by standing and staring at the water” . The time is ripe for IONS to ‘cross the sea’ and set out to achieve the higher purpose it was created for. However, IONS in its present form, under the existing guidelines or principles enshrined in the CoB, is illequipped to undertake multilateral, long-term operational measures for maritime security enforcement in the IOR. Short duration Military Operations Other Than War (MOOTW) such as HADR and Non-combatant Evacuation Operations (NEO), etc, and issues such as capacity/ capability development of IOR littorals, also require institutionalised multilateral mechanisms to be established, which cannot be governed by the simplistic IONS’ CoB. The present IONS structure can at best, implement short-term ad-hoc measures based on ‘consensus’ achieved during IONS seminars. But, IONS seminars cannot be convened at every instant an emergent situation develops, to seek consensus, take decisions and order implementation of security measures.

In the absence of a clear-cut and agreed policy, securing assets from member navies for meeting maritime security requirements would entail protracted discussions and deliberations over stretched communication links, by which time the initiative may be lost to other players in the region such as the extra-regional powers. Even if the navies were to pro-actively agree on deployment of resources, in the absence of approved policy, these would need government approvals, which would be subject to the inherent delays of bureaucratic red-tape. Deployment of forces also entail myriad issues such as command and control of forces at sea, monitoring and control centres ashore, use of air bases and harbours in each other’s territories, etc. In the absence of policy, these would need to be specified for each and every mission or tasking, which would be time-consuming and laborious, apart from the question mark over which navy would take the leadership to issue these orders. Other issues such as de-confliction with other constructs or extra-regional powers operating in the same region, legal issues (if the jurisdictional waters of nations are involved), handling and disposal of captured persons or vessels and equipment, etc, are issues which cannot be dealt with on an ad-hoc basis.

It is amply evident, therefore, that if IONS aspires to be the lead agency enforcing maritime security in the IOR, a Comprehensive Policy for Maritime Security is the foremost need of the hour. This is essential not only for getting all member states and navies on a common maritime security grid, but also to lay down guiding principles for the smooth deployment of forces and conduct of maritime security operations. A comprehensive, clear-cut and well publicized policy would also engender confidence in IONS, making it the first 'port of call' for littoral states, other maritime groupings or constructs, and even extra-regional players, on maritime security issues of the IOR.It is amply evident, therefore, that if IONS aspires to be the lead agency enforcing maritime security in the IOR, a Comprehensive Policy for Maritime Security is the foremost need of the hour. This is essential not only for getting all member states and navies on a common maritime security grid, but also to lay down guiding principles for the smooth deployment of forces and conduct of maritime security operations. A comprehensive, clear-cut and well publicized policy would also engender confidence in IONS, making it the first ‘port of call’ for littoral states, other maritime groupings or constructs, and even extra-regional players, on maritime security issues of the IOR.

Formulation of a Comprehensive Maritime Security Policy

Now that the need for a Comprehensive Maritime Security Policy for IONS has been established, how do we go about formulating it? First and foremost, IONS must change its moniker. The purpose and resolve of an organisation is represented by its name. ‘Symposium’ is a restrictive word limiting the scope of the endeavour. It must be replaced by a suitable word to symbolise an action-oriented organisation. Most importantly, before setting out towards implementation, commitment of members is essential, in every sense – financial resources, assets for operations, manpower, facilities, etc. These would, of course, need to be relative to the contributing capacity of the member. Once commitment of members is assured, the task of formulating policy to enable implementation of measures can commence.

The Charter of Business (CoB) is a good step forward, which espouses common understanding and singularity of purpose of IONS. Using this as the base, we must develop and set in place the Comprehensive Policy for Maritime Security, from which would flow subpolicies for the specific areas where measures need to be implemented. Some of these areas include HADR, Anti-Piracy, Anti-Trafficking (of all kinds), Anti-Terrorism, Search-andRescue (SAR), Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD), Hydrographic Survey, Submarine Rescue, Underwater Salvage, Maritime Domain Awareness (MDA), Maritime Information and Intelligence Sharing, NEO, etc.

However, there are a number of factors which would need to be deliberated and considered before embarking on the task of formulating the Comprehensive Policy. These factors are contentious by nature and resolving them prior to policy building is essential, as they would dictate the form and shape the policy would take subsequently. Obtaining consensus on these issues would also enable a smooth and expeditious policy formulation process and avoid confusion and disagreement further down the chain. Some of these ‘policy decisions’ which must be contemplated are brought out now.

Leadership and Organisational Structure

Presently, leadership in IONS is rotational and hence control of the organisation is dynamic and reliant on the style of control exercised by the incumbent Chair Navy. While conduct of current activities such as seminars, workshops, essay competitions, etc is relatively simple, control of operations for enforcement or implementation of maritime security measures, would require fixed command and control structures and hierarchies to be set in place. This is the first policy decision which needs to be taken as part of the Comprehensive Policy. A fixed IONS Control Centre or Headquarters, located in a consensually acceptable nation, along with its attendant organisational/ administrative set up and business rules, is essential. This Headquarters must be networked with the IONS Control Centres at the member navies’ levels. While the Chair of IONS could remain rotational, control must be exercised through the Headquarters, for which, the Chair can nominate a suitable Flag Officer as Secretary-General to head the multi-representational Headquarters organisation for the duration of the Chair’s tenure. The Comprehensive Policy would need to establish clear departmental structures for the organisation, the exercise of control and authority, flow of information and decision-making. Sub-policies would then follow for the functioning of the respective departments or divisions.

Operations and Exercises

The conduct of maritime security missions, scale of operations, deployment of assets, creation of task organisations for Command and Control, periodicity and scale of drills and exercises, evolution of common operating procedures, etc, are some aspects which would need to be deliberated to decide the scope of tasking envisaged to be undertaken by IONS, prior enshrining it in the Comprehensive Policy. Initially, the scope may need to be limited to periodic and situation-based tasking, and gradually expanded to include continuously deployed forces and round-the-clock operations. Appropriate operational planning structures and Command & Control, Communications and Intelligence (C3 I) networks would need to be established with requisite security overlays for effective conduct of maritime security operations. A Situation Control Centre (ideally co-located with the IONS Headquarters) would also be essential for coordination of underway operations and crisis management.

Finances

Implementation of maritime security measures would be capital-intensive. With vastly differing economic strengths and contributing capabilities among the member navies, securing finances would be complicated. The mechanism for financing operations would need to feature in the Comprehensive Policy. Contribution from member navies may suffice for initial small-scale operations. However, as the ambit of IONS increases, long-term measures such as feasibility of setting up a bank (IONS Bank) with governmental support, dedicated towards funding various maritime security initiatives, as also to provide assistance for capacity/ capability building of IOR littorals in the form of soft loans, could be explored. Apart from global financial institutions like the World Bank, Asian Development Bank (ADB), OPEC Fund for International Development (OFID), etc, beneficiaries of enhanced maritime security in the IOR such as shipping and energy production companies could contribute to the endeavour.

Legal Issues

Deploying forces on ground would incur the attendant complications of international and state laws, jurisdiction issues, legal rights, disposal of seized or captured vessels and crews, etc. The Comprehensive Policy would therefore, need to specify the framework for the organisation’s internal legislation processes, as well as, external legal issues which would affect the implementation of maritime security measures.

Formulating a Comprehensive Policy would require a detailed and exhaustive process involving discussions and deliberations between Subject Matter Experts (SMEs), domain experts, stakeholders, policy analysts and policy modelling experts. Policy formulation is a time-consuming activity and must be commenced as early as possible. Policy though, must be iterative and adapt to the changing situation. Therefore, rather than protracted deliberations for framing the ‘perfect’ policy, the basic policy framework could be set in place and implemented, with policy revisions periodically based on incremental experiential wisdom.

Challenges to Implementing Policy in IONS

The unique nature of maritime issues in the IOR and also the unique structure of IONS, present a number of challenges to the successful formulation and implementation of policy, which may prove stumbling blocks in progressing forward.

Coherence of Ideas

As mentioned earlier, putting ideas into action is extremely challenging, especially if it involves numerous players participating in decision-making on an equal footing (but unable to contribute resources on as equal a footing!). As the world today gyrates towards international partnerships and multilateral initiatives, achieving coherence of ideas and decisions is growing increasingly difficult. IONS would be no different!.

This is one aspect IONS will have to overcome, as ‘combined will’ is essential to take policy decisions and achieve meaningful outcomes.

Voluntarism

The founding principle of IONS is its ‘voluntary’ nature. But implementing policy in an organisation of voluntary character would be complicated. Policy cannot be optional. It has to be equally and universally applicable throughout the organisation and to all its members, who are then accountable for it. So while many navies may willingly attend seminars, not many would be eager to share resources for implementing maritime security measures, particularly if their resources are likely to be deployed in an endeavour which may have no direct benefit for them. Implementing policy is therefore, likely to contradict the voluntary nature of IONS, making it less appealing as an organisation.

Inequalities of National Power

The vast differences in national power of the member states of IONS may prove to be a stumbling block in formulating and implementing policy for the organisation. From developed nations, to developing nations with growing economies, and third world nations with economies in decline, the inequality in the ability to contribute resources to IONS is amply evident. Many third world nations would understandably prefer to concentrate on resolving internal problems, rather than allocate meagre resources for non-priority external issues. Appropriate mechanisms for scaling contribution levels would therefore have to be deliberated, to adopt a suitable policy model and assuage the apprehensions of smaller or weaker member states in IONS.

Congruence with National Foreign Policy

Naval assets being instruments of national power, deploying them for international multilateral tasks would depart from the purely naval sphere and introduce the aspect of foreign policy and diplomacy. In the absence of national policy on naval participation in multilateral initiatives in most (if not all) nations, political approval would be necessary to accept an IONS policy requiring deployment of national assets. Getting these approvals would be time-consuming and may likely come with certain ‘riders’ or conditions, to ensure such participation is in congruence with the foreign policy objectives of the nation.

Multiple Agencies for Maritime Security in IOR

The IOR is host to a number of multilateral and bilateral security initiatives apart from IONS. Regional Cooperation Agreement on Combating Piracy and Armed Robbery in Asia (ReCAAP), Contact Group on Piracy off the Coast of Somalia (CGPCS), Shared Awareness and De-confliction (SHADE), OP ATALANTA by EU Naval Forces (EUNAVFOR) off Somalia, Coalition Task Forces (CTF) 150, 151 and 152, the Trilateral Maritime Security Initiative between India, Sri Lanka and Maldives, etc are some of the multilateral constructs engaged in maritime security in the IOR. Some of these such as ReCAAP pre-date IONS. IORA too delves into maritime security issues as it has a direct linkage with the safety of maritime economic activity in the IOR. Apart from these, several bilateral endeavours are also being undertaken, such as India’s Coordinated Patrols (CORPATs) with Indonesia, Thailand, and Myanmar; Australia’s joint fisheries patrols with Indonesia, etc. Some nations, especially in South East Asia, are also active members of other non-IOR constructs such as ASEAN Defence Ministers Meet (ADMM& ADMM+). With the multitude of agencies undertaking similar tasks, there is bound to be an overlap with IONS’ intended missions. It would thus be prudent that, as far as possible, all maritime security endeavours involving IOR littorals be brought under the IONS umbrella, to enable more effective utilisation of resources and single agency control over the entire gamut of operations (which could be decentralised or delegated to the local/ regional navies, as required). Willingness of nations to subsume their respective bilateral or multilateral constructs under IONS would, therefore, need to be ascertained before formulating the IONS policy.

Inter-State Conflict/Rivalry

The successful implementation of policy will largely depend on the level of understanding and cooperation between the member states. Mutual hostility, suspicion and animosity between member states would be counter-productive to the aims of the organisation and would severely affect its functioning. The effect of India-Pakistan relations on the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) is a recent example. Other member states may be wary of committing resources to a venture, which could be held hostage by troubled relations between two or more nations, especially if they have powerful and influential navies. IONS must strive to rise above local sub-regional compulsions and petty issues. Competition for influence and factionalism within IONS would spell doom for the organisation. The IONS’ policy must therefore safeguard the organisation against such eventualities.

Influence of Extra-Regional Powers

A strong IONS may diminish the influence of the major extra-regional powers in the maritime security calculus of the IOR, and hence, expanding the scope of IONS’ activities into the operational domain may not be viewed favourably by them. These powers may therefore, lobby the smaller/ weaker member states, or exploit their favourable historic linkages with others, to persuade them into maintaining IONS ‘status quo’. Conversely, extra-regional powers, especially those with permanent military presence in the region, may use the opportunity to seek membership, with the offer of contributing resources and assets for operational tasking. The exact reactions of the various extra-regional powers cannot be determined or predicted at this stage, as a number of other factors would need to be considered, along with the dynamic nature of global strategy and geopolitics. Nevertheless, it may be concluded that, however strong and powerful IONS may emerge in the years to come, with large trade and economic considerations at play; it would be unwise to expect extra-regional powers to reduce their influence and military presence in the IOR. Therefore, it would be prudent for the IONS policy to factor in the role of extra-regional powers in the IOR and establish mechanisms to either cooperate, or de-conflict, their maritime security tasks in common areas of interest.

Proposed Way Ahead to Formulate the Comprehensive Policy

The last biennial IONS Seminar was held in Jan 2016 at Bangladesh, and the next one would be due in 2018 at Iran. The IONS Preparatory Workshop, would thus, likely be scheduled in 2017. It is recommended that the agenda for formulation of policy be taken up in full earnest at the Preparatory Workshop and firm proposals be formulated for discussion at the Seminar in 2018. The proposals may be forwarded to all members well before the Seminar, to enable discussion between the member navies and their respective government agencies to formulate the member states’ national views on the issue.

During the IONS Seminar 2018, the views of member states may be presented and collated, from which areas of agreement, divergence, and apprehension or uncertainty may be identified. Possible solutions to settle the differences of opinions and clear the uncertainties or apprehensions could then be deliberated. If a broad consensus were to evolve, a Core Group headed by a suitably experienced Flag Officer from the incumbent Chair Navy and with multirepresentational staff from member navies, could be constituted to prepare the Comprehensive Policy for IONS. The Core Group could be suitably empowered to interact with SMEs, policy experts and other agencies to evolve the most suitable policy which abides by the founding principles and tenets of IONS. The Core Group could also employ private think-tanks, research organisations or specialised ‘Organisation Development’ agencies to prepare policy models. The proposed policy could be presented for deliberation during the IONS Preparatory Workshop in 2019, after which the revised policy could be forwarded to member navies for discussion with their relevant government agencies. The IONS Seminar in 2020 could be the forum where the final deliberations and modifications to the policy could be undertaken prior finalisation. Once finalised the policy must be ratified within a finite time frame by member navies. Policy Working Groups may then be created to formulate sub-policies for the various areas of maritime security cooperation.

In the interim, operations and exercises may be commenced on an improvised basis, governed by the SOPs formulated by the IWGs. These operations and exercises would help in identifying loopholes and other critical areas which need to be addressed in the policy, to enable better conduct of maritime security operations.

Conclusion

In its eight years of existence, IONS has achieved a fair amount of conformity of thought and ideas amongst the naval community of the IOR. It is now time for IONS to scale up the dimensions of its activities towards achieving its intended potential. The kindling step is the formulation of the Comprehensive Maritime Security Policy, which would govern the future of the forum’s activities and enable long-term sustained missions or operations. Towards this, the role of the major member navies like India and Australia cannot be overemphasized. As brought out in the paper, a lot of groundwork would need to be done to develop consensus on evolving and putting a Comprehensive Maritime Security Policy in place for IONS. The time is ripe for this activity to be commenced, as the organisation has matured and remains one of the best subscribed maritime constructs in the region. The other major pan-IOR grouping IORA, has readily acknowledged the role of IONS in maritime security of the IOR and decided to align its maritime security initiatives with it27 . While decisions on IONS’ policy must not be taken in haste, too much caution would also be counterproductive. To put it in the words of Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru, independent India’s first Prime Minister,

As IONS evolves, the world looks on with keen interest to see the direction of its ‘wake’. It is up to the members of IONS to discard their myopic view and ensure that the initiative of IONS does not lose its relevance or get overshadowed by other developments or organisations in the region.

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